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ABSTRACT Cassander’s implementation of power during the early stages of his rule of 
Macedonia was wide ranging and multifaceted. He employed numerous different 
strategies to gain support from a variety of influential groups within the Macedonian 
homeland and adjacent areas to secure his position. Much of the discussion surrounding 
Cassander’s actions to accomplish control over Macedonia has focussed on his desire 
to become the next king in Macedonia as demonstrated by overt public actions, a feat 
he achieved after the Peace of 311. However, when one considers the coinage issued 
by Cassander prior to 311, this single-minded monarchic aim appears less evident, 
calling into question the strength of this understanding of his actions. 
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The winter of 317/316 BCE was a watershed moment for the Macedonian Empire and 
for the political landscape of the Macedonian homeland. Cassander, son of the former 
regent Antipater, had launched a successful invasion of Macedonia, ousting the 
incumbent regent, Polyperchon from power. From this point Cassander would embark 
on an ambitious plan to control the region. Over the following years he put in place a 
wide ranging and multifaceted strategy that drew upon many and varied avenues of 
support to cement his position. This period of time would see Cassander marry into the 
Argead family, initiate a significant building program in northern and southern Greece, 
remove the young Alexander IV from court, and bury the royal couple, Philip III 
Arrhidaeus and Adea-Eurydice at the traditional Argead burial ground at Aegae. For 
good reason, this series of events has drawn the attention of both ancient and modern 
writers, who have focused primarily on the monarchical aspects of Cassander’s actions, 
interpreting them as the first steps in his eventual ascension to the Macedonian throne 
and resulting in the foundation of the short-lived Antipatrid dynasty. While it is true 
that there are overt monarchic overtones to many of Cassander’s actions, these can 
overshadow the precarious position he faced during the early stages of his control over 
Macedonia. In particular, the records of his actions have led to overly simplistic 
depictions of the political situation in Macedonia. An evaluation of both the accounts 
of Cassander’s consolidation of power in Macedonia and of his numismatic self-
representation, which leads us to an interpretation of Cassander as less certainly intent 
on monarchy. This stands in contrast to the views found in the ancient literary sources 
and calls into question both the strength of Cassander’s position and the previous 
understandings of the inevitability of his cementing power. This discussion first 
considers Cassander’s actions during this period and then moves to exploration of the 
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ways in which he represented himself, with particular attention to the numismatic 
evidence from the early period of his control. 
Our most detailed account of Cassander’s actions following his invasion of 
Macedonia in late-317/early-316 is found within the history of Diodorus Siculus1. His 
account likely draws upon the work of Hieronymus of Cardia2, allowing Diodorus 
strong authority to outline each of Cassander’s approaches to power following the 
defeat of Polyperchon3. By cross-referencing Diodorus’ account with that of other 
available literary evidence, it is possible to separate Cassander’s approach to power into 
four distinct aspects: his marriage to Thessalonice4, the foundation of Cassandreia on 
the site of Potidaea and the reconstruction of Thebes5, the removal of Alexander IV 
from public life to Amphipolis6, and the burial of Philip III and Adea-Eurydice at 
Aegae7. Diodorus provides the greatest level of detail in discussion of Cassander’s 
actions, devoting nearly an entire section of his Book 19 to these events. This is the 
only source that records all four of these endeavours; the majority of other accounts 
recording Cassander’s actions exist in highly compressed states, or do not record all of 
his actions8. Despite the seeming abundance of accounts, the detail that can be drawn 
from them is surprisingly limited. 
What can be said is that Cassander’s implementation of power bears the hallmarks 
of a clinical and well-calculated strategy to effect control over Macedonia, each facet 
working in a different way to create and consolidate his powerbase. From these, a 
common thread that emerges is how each of these actions engages with those that have, 
until this time, typically been reserved for Macedonian royalty, and that, more 
specifically, mimic the precedents set by Philip II and Alexander III. Cassander’s 
marriage to Thessalonice9, his building programme10, the removal of Alexander IV 
                                                            
1 D.S. 19.52.1-5. 
2 Cf. POxy. 71.4808; HORNBLOWER 1981, 11-14; ANSON 2004, 6-11; ROISMAN 2010, 135; LANDUCCI 
GATTINONI 2013, 34; WHEATLEY 2013, 24; LANDUCCI 2017, 272. 
3 For an overview of the continuing war between Cassander and Polyperchon, see CARNEY 2014. 
4 D.S. 19.52.1; Just. 14.6.13; Paus. 9.7.3, (cf. 8.7.7); Porph. FGrH 260. F. 3.4; Syncellus Chron. 320. 
5 D.S. 19.52.2-3; Heidel. Epit. FGrH 155. F. 2; Marmor Parium. FGrH 239. B. 14; Plu. Alex. 11.10 
6 D.S. 19.52.4; Just. 14.6.13. 
7 D.S. 19.52.5; cf. Diyll. FGrH. 73. F. 1. 
8 Diyll. FGrH 73. F. 1; Heidel. Epit. FGrH 155. F. 2.3; Just. 14.6.13; Porph. FGrH. 260. F. 3.3-5; 
Syncellus. Chron. 320. 
9 FORTINA 1965, 40; CARNEY 1988, 388; 2000, 145; LANDUCCI GATTINONI 2003, 79-80; HECKEL 2006, 
80, 265; BOIY 2007, 142; CARNEY 2006, 108; CAROLI 2007, 49; PALAGIA 2008, 207; LANDUCCI 
GATTINONI 2009, 261-263; MEEUS 2009a, 249; WALLACE 2012-2013, 135. There is a possibility that 
Cassander may previously have been wed to another daughter of Philip II, Cynnane (GREENWALT 1988, 
94; CARNEY 2000, 69-70; HECKEL 2006, 64, 100-101; PALAGIA 2008, 196). For the possibility of 
Cassander’s previously Argead marriage, see PALAGIA, 2008. 
10 The first city reported in this programme was one that would take on Cassander’s own name, 
Cassandreia and which was incorporated into the previous site of Potidaea in Chalcidice, towards 
Cassander’s eastern boarders with Lysimachus (D.S. 19.52.2-3; cf. Heidel. Epit. FGrH 155. F. 2; 
Marmor Parium. FGrH 239. B. 14; Str. 7. fr. 25; Livy. 44.11.2). The second half of Cassander’s building 
programme would be situated in Boeotia, far to the south of Macedonia, with the reconstruction of 
Thebes in 315 (D.S. 19.54.1). Until Cassander’s programme, the establishment of eponymous cities had 
been an Argead institution, pioneered by Philip II within the renaming of Thracian cities of Crenidas to 
Philippopolis in 356 (D.S. 16.3.7, 16.8.6, 16.86; Pliny. HN. 4.18 cf. App. B Civ. 4.105; IG 22 127) and 
Eumolpias to Philippi in 342 (Plin.. HN. 4.18 cf. Ptol. Geog. 3.11, and possibly alluded to in D.S. 16.71.2 
and Str. 7.6.2; GARDINER 1918, 425; VELKOV 1979). Later, Alexander III would further expand upon his 
father’s actions with around fifteen Alexandrias founded throughout the expanding Macedonian Empire. 
The controversy surrounding the cities to which Alexander gave his name throughout his reign is outside 
the scope of this discussion, but for comments and discussion see: TARN 1950, 233-249; FRASER 1996 
esp. 191-201; esp. HAMMOND 1998, for an overview and critique of the ancient evidence. 
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from public life11, and the burial of Philip III and Adea-Eurydice at Aegae12, can each 
be tied to the actions of the Macedonian monarchy and, collectively, can be seen as 
explicit acts by Cassander to signal his royal succession. 
The monarchic connotations have not been lost on the ancient writers. They 
interpreted these actions as a deliberate attempt by Cassander to seize the Macedonian 
throne following the invasion of winter 317/316. Diodorus’ history provides the most 
explicit statement of this view, stating that Cassander had already set his desire on the 
kingship13. This sentiment is to be found in the works of both Porphyry and Syncellus14, 
further emphasising Cassander’s monarchic intentions immediately after the invasion. 
This position has, for good reason, permeated through modern scholarship15. Through 
the core actions described by Diodorus, it seems obvious that Cassander’s intention was 
to position himself as the next basileus16 of Macedonia. 
Some uncertainty, however, still exists regarding how Cassander implemented his 
strategies to control the region as well as the inevitability of the eventual foundation of 
the Antipatrid dynasty. As previously mentioned, there are limitations to the 
understandings that can be drawn from the ancient accounts, and in particular, 
Diodorus’ record of Cassander’s actions. More specifically, we do not know in what 
order these events took place beyond Diodorus’ sequencing. For example, it is not 
known whether these actions ran consecutively or simultaneously and how long each 
aspect of Cassander’s strategy took to implement. There are, however, two rough time 
markers within which his actions can be placed: the period following the execution of 
Olympias in the spring of 31617, and monarchic accusations against Cassander made by 
Antigonus at Tyre, along with the proclamation of freedom for the Greeks in the spring 
of 31518, thereby providing a time frame for Cassander’s takeover of Macedonia.  
One year allows time, for a multitude of conceivable events to have occurred, but 
reflection on at least some possible sequencing in worthwhile. Though there is no 
                                                            
11 D.S. 19.52.5; Just. 14.6.13. The removal of Alexander IV and his mother Roxane from the court and 
relocation to Amphipolis, deprived of royal treatment (τὴν ἀγωγὴν οὐκέτι βασιλικήν), and in the custody 
of his officer Glaucias, would give Cassander complete control over the young Argead, minimising the 
effect that he, or his heritage, could have on Cassander’s hope to seize power in Macedonia. Such control 
over a young king is similar to the regency, so much as it can be defined given the brevity of accounts, 
to Philip II’s and Amyntas IV (Just. 7.5.9; cf. D.S. 16.2.3; It must be said that Diodorus makes no 
reference to Philip II’s regency. Instead, Diodorus records an immediate succession to the throne by 
Philip. For remarks on the inconsistency of Diodorus’ account with that of Justin and Athenaeus, see: 
HAMMOND – GRIFFITH 1979, 208-209; HECKEL 2006, 208 n. 44, 288. For further discussion on Diodorus’ 
tendency for early monarchic readings, see below. 
12 Reflecting the royal burials of Philip II (D.S. 17.2.1; Just. 11.2.1; cf. ALONSO 2009, 277) and Alexander 
III (Curt. 10.8.18; ALONSO 2009, 282). See TARN 1927, 482; BOSWORTH 2002, 41; ALONSO 2009, 287-
288; LANDUCCI GATTINONI 2017, 130. 
13 D.S. 19.52.1: “…Κάσανδρος δέ, κατὰ νοῦν αὐτῷ τῶν πραγμάτων προχωρούντων, περιελάμβανε ταῖς 
ἐλπίσι τὴν Μακεδόνων βασιλείαν.” 
14 Porph. FGrH. 260. F. 3.4; Snycellus. Chron. 320. For general points on the representation of the 
Antipatrids within the literary sources, see WALSH 2012. 
15 See for example GEER 1947, 372-373 n. 2; ADAMS 1975, 97-98; HADLEY 1978, 229; ADAMS 1991, 28; 
CARNEY 2006, 83; CAROLI 2007, 49-50; ANSON 2008, 140; ERRINGTON 2008, 28; PALAGIA 2008, 206; 
YARDLEY – WHEATLEY – HECKEL 2011, 215; KOSMIN 2014, 218; LANDUCCI GATTINONI 2017, 131. 
16 For the most part and due to problems of strict definitions of Macedonian political offices as they 
appear in the literary records, I have avoided terminology such as strategos and basileus. This discussion 
focuses in any case on Cassander’s actions, rather than the legal extent of his office. For more on the 
difficulties of defining Macedonian offices that result from its treatment by the literary sources, see 
MEEUS 2009b, 289 n. 9.  
17 D.S. 19.51.1-2; Just. 14.6.6-9; Paus. 9.7.2; BOIY 2007, 142, 149 
18 D.S. 19.61.1-5; BOIY 2007, 143, 149; LANDUCCI GATTINONI 2017. 272. 
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particular reason to doubt Diodorus’ order of Cassander’s approach to power as he 
records it, it seems reasonable to suggest that events did not occur as a neat linear 
progression, but that there may have been a level of overlap between them. As ready 
examples, it is not unreasonable to assume that Cassander married Thessalonice, 
removed Alexander IV to Amphipolis and buried Philip III and Adea-Eurydice at 
Aegae during the process of founding Cassandreia and reconstructing Thebes. As 
another possibility, it may have been that Alexander IV’s relocation to Amphipolis took 
place after the burial of Philip III and Adea-Eurydice. While there is limited value in 
investigating each possible permutation and the implications thereof, it is important to 
acknowledge that the sequencing supplied by Diodorus may not, in and of, itself 
correlate to Cassander’s implementation of power.19 
Access into this shadowy period of time in Macedonia is difficult. The near uniform 
understanding of Cassander’s implementation of power during this time is limited to 
our literary evidence, which explicitly states that Cassander aspired to monarchy, and 
implies that he was secure in his position as governor of Europe. This in turn suggests 
that he was able to act with near impunity and that the throne of Macedonia was within 
his grasp at this time. Contrary to this view, however, there were very real internal 
problems facing Cassander in Macedonia following that invasion. As Goukowsky and 
Landucci Gattinoni have both identified, Cassander had a formidable task ahead of him 
in securing military control over the Macedonian homeland20, and gaining political 
control over it. Much of this internal support base would rest in the hands of the 
Macedonian aristocracy. Cassander appears to have accomplished this, possibly by 
exploiting the reaction by the aristocracy against the recent purges conducted by 
Olympias against them in the spring of 316. During these, Olympias eliminated those 
she believed to be sympathetic towards Cassander. These actions, as well as her 
treatment of Philip III and Adea-Eurydice prior to their deaths, incited hatred against 
her21. Cassander placed Olympias on trial before the Macedonian assembly, leaving it 
for them to decide her fate22. In similar fashion to the earlier political executions 
conducted by Cassander, for instance the execution of his general Nicanor in 31723, 
Olymipas’ fate was left, at least nominally, in the hands of a group whose support would 
be vital for his administration of Macedonia.  
The question remains of how Cassander negotiated a delicate balance between 
securing support from influential elements of internal Macedonian groups while at the 
same time establishing himself as primary ruler in the region. While the more overtly 
                                                            
19 See below n. 35. 
20 GOUKOWSKY 1978-81, i, 107; LANDUCCI GATTINONI 2003, 126 highlights that Cassander could not 
count on Argead support once he returned to Macedonia; cf. LANDUCCI GATTINONI 2010, 117. See: 
GRUEN 1985 [2018], 111-115 for more on the delicate balance the Diadochoi needed to maintain between 
building personal support bases and assuming royal positions, as well as ALONSO 2009, 285-288 for 
discussion on Cassander specifically. 
21 D.S. 19.11.8-9; Just. 14.5.10, 14.6.1-2; Paus. 9.7.2. 
22 D.S. 19.51.1-2: “ὧν ποιησάντων τὸ προσταχθὲν καὶ μὲν Ὀλυμπιάδος οὔτε παρούσης οὔτε ἐχούσης 
τοὺς ἀπολογησομένους οἱ μὲν Μακεδόνες κατεγίνωσκον αὐτῆς θάνατον….”; Just. 14.6.6-9: “Sed 
Cassander ad contionem vocato populo, sciscitaturus quid de Olympiade fieri velint, subornat parentes 
interfectorum, qui sumpta lugubri veste crudelitatem mulieris accusarent. A quibus accensi Macedones 
sine respectu  pristinae maiestatis occidendam decernunt, inmemores ororsus, quod per filim eius 
virumque non solum vitam ipsi inter finitimos tutam habuissent, verum etiam tantas opes imperiumque 
orbis quaesissent”; Paus. 9.7.2: “δοκεῖ δε μοι τὰς Θήβας οἰκίσαι ὁ Κάσσανδρος κατὰ ἔχθος Ἀλεξάνδρου 
μάλιστα: ἐπεξῆλθε δὲ καὶ τὸν πάντα οἶκον Ἀλεξάνδρου φθείρων, ὅς Ὀλυμπιάδα γε παρέβαλε καταλεῦσαι 
τοῖς ἐπ᾽αὐτὴν Μακεδόνων παρωξυσμένοις…”; MEEUS 2009a, 514. For further discussion on the show-
trial nature of Olympias’ trial, see CARNEY 2006, 82-87. 
23 Polyaen. 4.11.2; cf. DS. 18.75.1; Trog. Prol. 14; HECKEL 2006, 178. 
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monarchic aspects of his actions would be used against him by rivals among the 
Diadochoi, it is less clear how significant these were for groups within Macedonia. We 
do, however, have some insight into how Cassander chose to represent himself to these 
groups within Greece and Macedonia. Following the conquest of Macedonia, 
Cassander gained authority over the mints in Macedonia, located at Pella and 
Amphipolis24. By extension, this gave him control over the iconography upon the coins 
issued from these mints. Coins continued to be issued during this period, and a largely 
coherent sequence of the issues produced throughout his reign is available, with on-
going production evidenced by the continued issue of posthumous gold and especially 
silver coinage of Philip II and Alexander III25. However, while this is not a new body 
of evidence, their potential contribution to the discussion of Cassander’s 
implementation of power over the Macedonian homeland has been largely ignored26. 
Given the availability of untapped material that can aid in our understanding of his 
actions and position during 316-315, this is worthy of further discussion.  
The precedent for regnal coinage early in a new Argead ruler’s reign, marking the 
transition of power, is a strong one. Soon after beginning their reigns, Philip II, 
Alexander III, and Philip III all produced a variety of gold and silver coins, marking 
their ascendance to power27. This phenomenon would be continued past the zenith of 
Argead power in the empire, as the Diadochoi, Cassander included, would mint coinage 
to mark their transitions from satraps and officers to monarchs as the founders of the 
Hellenistic dynasties28. However, no alteration to the coinage issued by the mints under 
Cassander’s control would take place at any point during his early implementation of 
power. These coins stand in stark contrast to previous Argead precedents, later issues 
by the Diadochoi and Cassander himself, as well as the explicit monarchic implications 
outlined by the literary sources. Cassander would eventually add his name to bronze 
coinage (ΚΑΣΣΑΝΔΡΟΥ, and later ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΚΑΣΣΑΝΔΡΟΥ)29, though these 
issues appear to have been struck after 310, long after his conquest of Macedonia and 
as part of a wider adoption of monarchic representations by the Diadochoi following 
the Peace of 31130. We know that it was possible for Cassander to mint coins during 
                                                            
24 HEAD 1911, 228; MØRKHOLM 1991, 42, 59, 79; VALASSIADES 2003, 405. MØRKHOLM 1991, 42 raises 
the possibility of the existence of a third mint located at Aegae which would have come under 
Cassander’s control at this time. Diodorus reports that Pella and Amphipolis came under Cassander’s 
control shortly after the conclusion of the siege of Pydna, around the spring of 316 (D.S. 18.50.7-
18.51.1). 
25 GARDINER 1918, 428; SELTMAN 1955, 219; MØRKHOLM 1991, 59-60. The posthumous coinage of 
Philip II may have been initiated by Cassander’s father, Antipater, at some point after 323: MARTIN 1985, 
138; cf. LE RIDER 1977, 398-399, 433. 
26 One notable exception is Troxell’s survey of Macedonian coinage (TROXELL 1997, 96), who has raised 
a number of useful suggestions that attempt to homogenise the literary and numismatic data sets in 
relation to Cassander’s new administration. The lack of inclusion of numismatic evidence, and the 
information it can add to historiographical investigation, is by no means unique to Cassander. As 
WHEATLEY 2009, 129-130 notes, this is a common and unfortunate oversight in a period when primary 
source information is limited. 
27 For Philip II, see GARDINER 1918, 422-423; SELTMAN 1955 199-200. For Alexander III, see GARDINER 
1918, 426; SELTMAN 1995 204-205; MØRKHOLM 1991 42; TROXELL 1997, 95. For Philip III Arrhidaeus, 
see GARDINER 1918 429; MØRKHOLM 1991 56-57; TROXELL 1997, 95. 
28 HEAD 1911, 228, 229, 756, 848; SELTMAN 1955, 219; PRICE 1974, 21, 24; MØRKHOLM 1991, 27, 59, 60, 
65, 71 
29 HEAD 1911, 228; SELTMAN 1995, 219 (cf. pl. L.3); PRICE 1974, 26 (cf. pl. xii. 65); MILLER 1991, 53-
54; MØRKHOLM 1991, 59-60; VALASSIADES 2003, 405, 406. 
30 D.S. 19.105.1; PRICE 1974, n. 65, 44; BILLOWS 1990, 159; SHIPLEY 2000, 43; ANSON 2008, 139; 
KOSMIN 2014, n. 4, 205; cf. Just. 15.2.12-13; HEAD 1911, 228; MÜLLER – VON PROKESCH-OSTEN – HEAD 
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the intervening period between 316-310, as there appears to have been a continuation 
of coins produced by these mints, during this period31. This means that there was ample 
opportunity for him to follow the Argead precedent to signal his succession should he 
have chosen to do so. The reason for this continuation of incumbent numismatic issues 
may never be known, nevertheless, the lack of change in coinage, in contrast with the 
otherwise highly public statements of power and succession by Cassander is striking 
and must be recognised in the discussion regarding his ability to secure his position in 
Macedonia. Rather than demonstrating aspirations to monarchy, the coins issued by 
Cassander indicate the complex multifaceted approach he took to power during the 
early phases of his rule in Macedonia. 
So, how can these two seemingly incongruous, aspects of Cassander’s new 
administration in Macedonia be reconciled? Given the relatively small corpus of 
available literary source information, the exclusion of the numismatic data in the search 
to understand Cassander’s implementation of power would be foolhardy. While they 
do adhere to an overall numismatic tradition among the Diadochoi prior to the Peace of 
311, the coins minted under Cassander’s control should equally be included in the 
discussion of his approach to power. Is it possible that the central actions outlined by 
the likes of Diodorus, Justin, and the Heidelberg Epitome and their monarchic 
connotations were regarded as acceptable by Cassander’s support base, while alteration 
to royal coinage might be seen as an overreach? Could the continuation of the war 
against Polyperchon and the risk of alienating powerful support groups in Macedonia 
have been a concern? A glaring possibility for Cassander’s actions that must be 
acknowledged within the discussion of his new government is the one raised by 
Hammond and Walbank in the late-1980s. They suggest that a simple and elegant 
explanation for Cassander’s actions may be consideration of administrative 
expectations for Cassander during this period and that, as the only eminent officer 
within Macedonia without any clear alternative, it was “in every way appropriate that 
Cassander arranged the funeral [of Philip III and Adea-Eurydice], as he had been 
appointed ‘administrator of the kingdom’ by Philip III and Eurydice…and was acting 
now in that capacity for the child king [Alexander IV]32”. This assessment by 
Hammond and Walbank covers some, but not all of Cassander’s actions, as it does not 
address the building campaigns, or the marriage to Thessalonice. However, the practical 
process and necessities of governing the Macedonian homeland does serve as a simple 
and compelling interpretation of many of Cassander’s early actions after his successful 
invasion. While there is much to this sentiment, it appears to have gained little traction 
within understandings of Cassander’s new government, against the monarchic focus 
found in the works of Diodorus33. Certainly, some of Cassander’s actions, as 
highlighted by Hammond and Walbank, would easily fit into the administrative 
expectations of Macedonian’s governor, however Cassander’s marriage to 
Thessalonice and his building program appear to overstep these restrictions, indicating 
that Cassander’s aims were loftier than coherent stable administration. Regarding the 
contributions that Cassander’s numismatic production can make to understanding of his 
implementation of power it is prudent to acknowledge their limit and the tentative 
nature of the conclusions that can be drawn from them. It seems that Cassander, over 
the course of his regency, and in spite of his actions in 316, attempted to distance 
                                                            
1981, xxiv, 138; MILLER 1991, 53; O’NIEL 2000, 127; VALASSIADES 2003, 405; GRUEN 1985 [2018], 
115. 
31 See above n. 25. 
32 HAMMOND – WALBANK 1988, n. 2, 145; cf. TROXELL 1997, 96. 
33 See above: n. 16. 
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himself publicly from the position of basileus for a number of years after the invasion 
in the winter of 317/316. This supports the representation found in Plutarch’s Life of 
Demetrius and highlights a reluctance on the part of Cassander to assume the title of 
basileus throughout much of his reign as regent and king34. Additionally, there may 
have been some eagerness to apply early monarchic intentions by our chief source 
Diodorus. As Heckel has noted, Diodorus has also displayed a readiness to bypass 
periods of transition from regency to monarchic rule within a Macedonian context, 
which further compounds the complexity of untangling our understanding of 
Cassander’s implementation of power35. This understanding of the intentions 
underpinnings Cassander’s actions may have had their origins in Hieronymus’ history, 
or may have been emphasized later by Diodorus. While the sentiment was more likely 
transferred from Hieronymus into the later work of Diodorus,36 it is clear that the 
sentiment has traversed the majority of the literary sources to provide a strong 
representation of Cassander’s actions as monarchic. Returning to the numismatic 
evidence, however, it is telling that out of the various records available to us for an 
evaluation of Cassander’s image, and intentions during the period after his conquest of 
Macedonia, the only source that bypasses the interpretation and digestion via 
intermediary writer is that of the coins that were minted under his control. Out of our 
available records, the only one that does not adhere to the explicit assertion of 
monarchic succession is that of Cassander’s coins. The numismatic evidence assert that 
Cassander did not extend his monarchic ambition throughout the entirety of his 
approach to seizing power. 
While this may be seen as a semantic argument over the distinction between the 
positions of governor, king, and Cassander’s quasi-monarchic endeavors, the lack of 
alteration from the mints under Cassander’s control suggests that he was, to some extent 
at least, restricted in his bid for power, forcing him to straddle a nuanced middle-ground 
between the role of governor and king. Rather than viewing Cassander’s numismatic 
output as an aberration in his implementation of power, or even as an oversight in his 
plans, leading to the continuation of early Hellenistic numismatic tradition prior to the 
Peace of 311, the lack of alteration to the coinage under his control is indicative of the 
multifaceted approach Cassander made towards securing his position in the 
Macedonian homeland. It indicates that Cassander was required to balance expansion 
of power over Macedonia and did so through a variety of avenues. Through each of the 
four points described by Diodorus, Cassander was able to implement a wide-ranging 
plan with the goal of securing the Macedonian homeland under his new regime. From 
each of these actions, the marriage to Thessalonice, the building campaign upon which 
he embarked, the removal of Alexander IV to Amphipolis and the reburial of Philip III 
and Adea-Eurydice, it is possible to see the early hallmarks that would one day act as 
the foundation of the Antipatrid dynasty and Cassander’s eventual ascension to the 
position of Macedonia’s next king. However, when we include the oft overlooked 
numismatic evidence from the period, a different image of Cassander emerges, in which 
his actions appear less distinctly expressive of monarchic ambitions and more like ad 
hoc responses to circumstances. The incorporation of this evidence challenges the 
understandings found in the literary sources and offers a more nuanced picture of the 
man who would serve as the ruler of Macedonia for the next two decades. 
 
                                                            
34 Plu. Demtr. 18.2.; BILLOWS 1990, 156; MILLER 1991, 53; O’NIEL 2000, 127; cf. Just. 15.2.12; 
YARDLEY – WHEATLEY – HECKEL 2011, 245-246; GRUEN 1985 [2018], 115. 
35 HECKEL 2006, n. 44, 288.  
36 See LANDUCCI 2017, for more on Hieronymus’ representation of the Antipatrids. 
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